Which concepts and strategies should the international community adopt in response to China’s growing self-confidence? A reading sample from “China’s Self-Conception and the Security Environment in East Asia. Is There (Still) a Chance for Cooperative Security?” by Michael Staack. Read a snippet from the sixth chapter “Recommendations for German and European Policies”.
6 Recommendations for German and European Policies
“Europe must find its way in a world that is profoundly influenced by China in every dimension – not always in line with European conceptions, but also not fundamentally contrary to them. […] With regard to its fundamental political orientation and the question of how to handle the ever-increasing conflict between China and the USA, Europe is facing an even more complicated challenge. The general principle to be followed should be to avoid being drawn into one of the camps and instead maintain constructive relations with both sides. Adopting the policy of ‘strategic decoupling’ recently pushed in Washington or even containing China serves neither European material interests nor the desire for a peaceful and open world that is not divided into camps. The fundamental normative dividing lines between Brussels and Beijing are apparent and will remain an element of rivalry. A policy of strategic autonomy and critical but not equal distance to both sides therefore offers the best chances of accommodating these differences. In this way, Europe can pursue an independent policy of détente and act as a mediator, bridging the gap of trust between the two superpowers. The political responsibility for peace strongly requires such a role to be fulfilled which is likely to be backed by strong support from numerous other states that also do not wish to return to a rigid bloc mentality.” (Friedensgutachten 2021: 45, author’s translation)
“In Southeast Asia, the EU is regarded as a desirable partner that is appreciated above all for its credible commitment to a rule-based and multilateral order. This could be used to establish Europe as a neutral, value-based power that exerts equal influence on all parties to the conflict. Europe’s good reputation, however, also demands insistence on the recognition of international law and the acceptance of specific judgements to be expressed not only towards China but towards all parties to the conflict that have territorial claims. External actors such as the USA or Japan should also be reminded to reconsider their own claims for exclusive economic zones elsewhere.” (Friedensgutachten 2021: 36, author’s translation)
1. The European Union should not take sides in the major conflict between the USA and China, but adopt an independent position. Thus, it would live up to its goals of contributing to the shaping of the international order through its own initiatives, promoting peace and security and acting as an independent global actor. On many issues, the EU and the United States of America are able and likely to agree on common or similar positions that should also be asserted jointly. Unlike the USA, however, the EU does not see itself in a competition for global supremacy with China. It should also have no interest in promoting a new bipolarity as a structuring principle in a complex international system. The EU’s strategy on China established in 2019 with its three elements of partnership, competition and systemic rivalry provides a good framework for actively shaping the pattern of relations in all three dimensions.
The observations presented here on the common grounds for the cooperation between the EU and the USA apply to those administrations that are without doubt embedded in the democratic spectrum. There must be no such cooperation with a right-wing populist administration that includes right-wing extremists, if the EU wants to continue to consider itself a community of peace and values. The purpose and aim of the Atlantic Alliance (NATO) too are not above liberal democracy, but presuppose it.
2. The policy of great power competition between the USA, China and Russia, which was proclaimed by the Trump administration (2017) and is essentially continued by the Biden administration, has not been thought through. The objective of this long-term policy is not clearly defined. The implicit aim of fully implementing the USA’s concepts of order and comprehensively asserting its hegemonic position in the international system seems questionable in view of structural trends towards multipolarity and the diffusion of power. The Biden administration has complemented the concept of fundamental competition with China by recognising the need for cooperation, i.e., on climate change or arms control. However, it has also extended this competition – and thus widened its boundaries even further – by an ideological dimension (autocracy versus democracy). The focus of the practical implementation is not on democracy but on containment and rollback. The proclamation of strategies that have no end point and no exit has a long but rather uninspiring tradition in the United States. A case in point is the war on terror proclaimed in 2001, whose preliminary results – up to the debacle in Afghanistan (2021) – can be assessed as moderately successful – or worse. The EU should stay away from strategies that do not have an end point, focus and exit. It should also be aware of the fact that these concepts do not include an independent role for it.
3. Human rights as the international order’s third central pillar – together with the principles of sovereignty and the prohibition on the use of force – are not negotiable for Germany and the EU. According to the understanding of modern international law, the concept of human rights must not be limited to traditional civil liberties, but must also include social rights and participatory rights. The persistent advocacy of human rights is of great importance especially in the relations with non-Western states. While at no time did China and the EU have a common understanding on human rights in general, there are some areas where there used to be more common ground than currently is. An EU human rights policy geared to actual progress should clearly identify deficits and favour a strategy of dialogue. Human rights and rule of law dialogues with the People’s Republic of China should be continued and deepened. A country’s credibility is invariably determined, to a great extent, by the implementation of human rights at home and the avoidance of double standards. Human rights problems must also be discussed with states like India or Singapore, which are still or have been until recently labelled as “partners with whom the West shares common values”. It is evident from all past experience that, in the relationship between the EU or Germany and China, sanctions are an ambivalent instrument for achieving changes in behaviour. They are more likely to contribute to the hardening of political positions and make the sometimes- controversial dialogue more difficult. The EU should be aware of this when imposing sanctions in the event of human rights violations anyway.
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China’s Self-Conception and the Security Environment in East Asia.
Is There (Still) a Chance for Cooperative Security?
by Michael Staack
About the book “China’s Self-Conception and the Security Environment in East Asia”
China’s economic, technological, political, scientific, and military rise has significant implications for both the international system and the regional dynamics in East Asia. The People’s Republic views this development as a resurgence, a return to a leading global position. This study reflects on this process and discusses the concepts and strategies that the international community might adopt in response to China’s growing self-confidence.
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